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Abstract
Germany provides an especially interesting case for the study o f strategic voting 
because they use a two-ballot system on Election Day. Voters are encouraged to split 
their votes using different strategies. The paper is an example o f how much more can be 
learned if we reconsider and refine our theories. I provide a first step towards a theory 
of strategic voting and add it to the typical ticket splitting discussion. In order to test 
more refined hypotheses about ticket splitting and strategic voting I use cross-sectional 
data from the German National Post Election Study o f 1998. Empirically, the results 
indicate that strategic voters are different from ordinary ticket splitters. Evidence 
from separate MNP estimation for East and West Germany shows that identifier of 
the FDP or the Greens are more likely strategic voters as opposed to non-strategic 
ticket splitters. Non-strategic ticket splitters in East Germany do not feel close to any 
political party. In West Germany non-strategic ticket splitters have conflicting party 
preferences. Thus, it proves useful to separate out strategic voters from ordinary ticket 
splitters in future work.
*Prepared for delivery at the annual meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, 
Chicago, April 27-30, 2000. I am especially grateful to Stanley Feldman and Dean Lacy for 
being a constant source o f support. Dean also provided me with some of his LIMDEP and 
STATA code. Also many thanks to Scott Graves and Pushkar Wagle for helpul comments on 
various parts during the research process. The errors are my sole responsibility. I appreciate 
any comments on this paper.
1 Introduction
Germany provides an interesting case for the study of strategic voting because of the two- 
ballot system, which allows voters to split their votes. Voters are generally called strategic 
if they do not cast a vote for their most preferred candidate on the first ballot or do not 
cast a vote for their most preferred party on the second ballot. Voting for first preferences 
is usually called a sincere vote. Hence, strategic voters may theoretically cast a straight 
ticket or split their ticket. However, not every ticket splitter is strategic because voters could 
deviate from the local candidate of their most preferred party if there is a more compelling 
one. This routine is generally called a personal vote (Cain et al. 1987).
Besides a personal vote, there are other conceivable reasons to split a ticket: There 
are certain types of strategic voting, e.g. tactical votes and loan votes (Gschwend 1999) 
which require voters to split their tickets. These particular groups of ticket splitter can 
have a substantial impact on the outcome of a Federal election. Thurner and Pappi (1998) 
find that for some voters the ticket splitting pattern mirrors their most preferred coalition. 
Furthermore, there are probably many more idiosyncratic factors at work that determine 
whether someone splits his or her ticket. The aim of this paper is not to disentangle all 
these different routines. My goal is to provide evidence that if we study strategic voting, at 
least in the German context, it is useful to separate out strategic voters from ordinary ticket 
splitters. Strategic voters are different.
2 Strategic considerations in the German electoral sys­
tem
The two-ballot system provides ample opportunity for German voters to split their ticket 
in an election for the same level of governance. Voters have preferences about the major 
parties on the ballot. However, besides their party preferences voters might take the context
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in which the election is held into consideration. By context I do not only mean election 
specific factors, like the popularity of certain issues, parties or candidates. In order to cast 
the most effective vote some Germans might also consider the tricky electoral rules. Voters 
anticipate the election outcome or the chances of victory for certain parties and candidates 
but their assessment is made within the rules o f the electoral system. These rules constrain 
voter’s preferences. Voters are generally assumed to be strategic if they end up not voting 
for their most preferred candidate or party because of the contextual constraints. What does 
strategic voting mean in the German context and how is it related to ticket splitting? For 
an easier understanding of the contextual constraints I provide a short summary of the most 
important electoral rules of the German electoral system.
Since 1953, the Germans have used a two-vote ballot on Election Day. The first vote is 
for a local candidate in the district. Plurality rule determines the winner of every district 
seat for the German parliament (Bundestag). More important for the election outcome is the 
second vote. It is a vote for a party list, which determines proportionally the total number of 
party seats in the Bundestag. Then, the party’s parliamentary group consists of all district 
races winners together with the respective number of representatives from the party lists.
However, there are three deviations from a purely proportional system. First, in order 
to be represented in the Bundestag, a party has to gain nationally at least 5% of the total 
second votes. This threshold assures that very small parties cannot play a decisive role in 
the parliamentary system. Second, a party can also gain seats in parliament if at least three 
of its candidates win their constituency races. In this case the ’5%-threshold’ does not apply 
and the party gains seats according to their proportion o f total second vote shares. Thus, 
nationally small parties which are regionally successful can also gain representation. The 
classic example for this rule is the 1994 election, where the PDS won four districts in East 
Germany and, therefore, gained 30 seats, proportionally to their second vote shares although 
the party gained only 4.4% of the second votes nationally. Finally, if a party gains more
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district seats with the first vote than its proportional share as determined by the second 
vote, the party is allowed to keep these surplus mandates (Uberhangmandate).
The first vote and, thus, the district races are not considered very important in Germany. 
Voters seldom know the name of their local party candidates. The names of these candidates 
are dominated by the party names, which are attached to them on the first ballot. Conse­
quently, on the district level one can see a general pattern in the relationship between first 
and second vote shares. Usually, the winner of a district race is the candidate of the same 
party that gets the most second votes in that district.
Since there is a two-ballot system one can identify two types of strategic voting, a tactical 
vote and a loan vote (Gschwend 1999). The strategy for the first vote follows the Duvergerian 
logic of not ’wasting’ a vote on a hopeless candidate (Duverger 1954). A supporter of a 
small party, say FDP, should use her first vote strategically for the local candidate of the 
big coalition partner, which is the CDU, in order to avoid wasting her vote on the FDP 
candidate who has no chance to win the district race. Thus, such a voter would cast a 
strategic first vote and a sincere second vote. The same reasoning applies to the SPD, as 
a big party, and the Greens, respectively. For the second vote there is another strategy. 
Since it is unlikely for a big party, like the CDU 1, to get an absolute majority of the seats 
in parliament the government formation process is usually determined by coalition politics. 
A CD U /FD P or a SPD/Green coalition, i.e. a coalition of a big and a small party, are 
the most viable coalition formations in German politics. A CDU supporter might cast a 
strategic second vote for the FDP in order to help the small party to overcome the 5%- 
threshold. Without the small coalition partner represented in parliament no big party has a
1I consider the CDU/CSU party cartel between the Christian Democratic Party and the 
Christian Social Union as inseparable. For simplicity, I use only the CDU notation for this 
party cartel.
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reasonable chance to get a majority of the second votes. Again, the same reasoning holds for 
SPD and the Greens, respectively. Note both strategies are observationally equivalent. First 
vote for the big coalition party and second vote for the respective small coalition partner. 
I coded, therefore, respondents who say they voted for CDU with their first vote and FDP 
with their second vote as strategic voters. The same coding was done for respondents who 
report casting their first vote for the SPD and their second vote for the Greens.
3 Strategic Voting and the Ticket Splitting Literature
While studying split ticket voting in the German context has taken off in the last few years 
(Gschwend 1999; Hilmer and Schleyer 1999; Schoen 1999a,b; Thurner and Pappi 1998, 1999), 
it is hardly a new topic in the American political science literature (Beck et al. 1992; Campbell 
and Miller 1957; DeVries and Tarrance 1972; Fiorina 1992; Walter E. Mebane 2000). The 
understanding of ticket splitting in the U.S. - a vote for a candidate of another party for a 
different level of governance - apparently differs from the meaning in the German electoral 
system. However, it is reasonable to look at the U.S. ticket splitting literature as well since 
I assume that the cognitive processes necessary to comprehend the contextual constraints 
and deviate from a straight-ticket baseline are comparable in both systems.
For the U.S. the literature developed two different strands. One of them focuses on the 
visibility and quality of candidates as well as incumbency effects. The other concentrates on 
the role of voter characteristics. There are conflicting results in the lieterature for possible 
suspects that facilitate ticket splitting like age, education and awareness. The common 
finding seems to be, though, that ticket splitter have weak partisan loyalties (Beck et al. 
1992; Campbell and Miller 1957). The common wisdom in Germany points in a similar 
direction. Baker et al. (1981) provide evidence at the aggregate level that the decline of 
partisan strength parallels the rise of ticket splitting. On the individual level, at least based 
on bivariate analysis, Hilmer and Schleyer (1999) characterize ticket splitters in the 1998
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Federal election as young, well-educated and highly interested in politics. They also find 
that self-employed voters are more likely to split their ticket than others are.
Scholarly work about German ticket splitting behavior has at least three major weak­
nesses. First, the studies are mostly descriptive and apparently data driven. Second, as 
in the U.S., ticket splitters are treated as one group. This might be of no great concern 
in this country but for the German multi-party system with complicated electoral rules it 
makes a big difference. The German literature (Hilmer and Schleyer 1999; Schoen 1999a) 
fails to differentiate ticket splitter and strategic voter. Ticket splitters are lumped together 
in one group and scholars focus solely on the attitudinal and sociodemographic differences 
between them and straight ticket voters. This is an oversimplification of the ticket splitting 
phenomenon. There might be quite different reasons why voters split their tickets. In this 
paper I start to disentangle the residual category and show that strategic voters are quite 
different ticket splitters. The third weakness of the literature is a methodological issue. 
Scholars use inappropriately linear probability models to study the distribution of a limited 
dependent variable (Schoen 1999a) or rely on bivariate analysis (Hilmer and Schleyer 1999). 
I will first estimate a probit model to test possible explanations about ticket splitting with 
an appropriate multivariate model. In order to test my underlying hypothesis that strategic 
voters are quite different from non-strategic ticket splitters I estimate a three-choice model 
by multinomial probit (MNP). This research design allows me to distinguish ordinary non- 
strategic ticket splitters from strategic voters while accounting factors causing straight ticket 
voting.
4 Data and Model Specification
Throughout my analysis I use the German National Post Election Study (GNES) 1998. 
It is provided by the Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin for Social Research (W ZB). The GNES 
consists out of two representative samples, one for East and one for West Germany. Since
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the political landscape in East and West Germany are quite different I estimate separate 
models for both parts. I exclude non- voters from the data since I am interested only in a 
certain type of voters - namely ticket splitters. The dependent variable, Y , is dichotomous, 
scoring 1  if voters split their ticket and 0  for respondents casting a straight ticket. I use the 
standard recall question for it.
Previous studies (Hilmer and Schleyer 1999) show, that in Germany younger voter are 
more prone to split their ticket than older voters are. Theoretically, though, age is an 
ambiguous concept since it is not possible with cross-sectional data to distinguish aging 
effects from period or cohort effects. Thus, age is more of a control variable in the model. 
However, I do not assume, as other studies have (Campbell and Miller 1957; Beck et al. 1992), 
a linear relationship between age and the likelihood to split a ticket. I expect a curvilinear 
relationship of age on the Y. Thus, I also include age2 (X 2) an interaction of the age variable 
(X i) with itself. The age variable is created from the question of when the respondent is 
born. Since this relationship is expected to be curvilinear the coefficient of X\ is negative 
and the coefficient of X 2 to be positive. Voters might desert the local candidate of their most 
preferred party if there is a more compelling one. It is hard to test such a ’personal vote’ 
(Cain et al. 1987) directly. However, it is reasonable to assume that such voters do at least 
remember correctly the name of this candidate. Hence, I include a dummy (X 3 ) scoring one 
if the respondent remembers correctly the name of the candidate he or she recalls to have 
voted for. This measure is definitely confounded with general awareness of respondents. I 
expect the coefficient of X 3 to be positive.
Moreover, I expect that voters with a clear preference for a party are less likely to split 
their ticket as opposed to respondents who are conflicted between liking two ore more parties 
equally. Thus, I include a dummy (X 4 ) scoring 1 if the respondent has a clear, i.e. only 
one, first party preference and expect the coefficient to be negative. I used party sympathy
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scores to construct this measure 2. Of course, I include a measure for the strength of party 
identification (X 5) one of the most robust findings in the ticket splitting literature. X 5 is a 
folded scale ranging from 0 ( =  no PID) to 3 ( =  very strong). I expect strong partisans 
to be innocent of committing the act of ticket splitting as opposed to non-partisans. Thus 
the coefficient should be negative. However, more specifically, the discussion about strategic 
voting shows that there is more constraint for small party supporters like the FDP or the 
Greens to split their ticket as opposed to SPD or CDU identifier. Therefore, I include two 
dummies scoring 1 for CDU and SPD partisans (Xg) and the other (X 7 ) scoring one for 
FDP and Green identifier and expect a positive coefficient for the big party dummy and 
a negative coefficient for the small party dummy. The omitted category consists of other 
partisans or of respondents who do not identify themselves with any party. To account for 
the impact of a changing political environment, the weakening of partisan attachments and 
especially the rise of floating voters I use a loyalty dummy (X 8), scoring 1  if respondents 
recall casting a vote for the same party in previous elections as compared to 1998. Thus, I 
expect the coefficients to be negative.
Since I assumed throughout this paper that casting a straight ticket should be the baseline 
behavior I expect people with higher education, higher level of political knowledge and 
voters who are interested in politics to be more likely to split their ticket. These people, 
presumably, do not solely rely on party labels as a cognitive shortcut to make their vote 
decision and are more likely to vote strategically. I use an education scale (Xg) ranging from 
1 (=  no high school degree) to 9 (=  university degree). It is well known, that in the U.S.,
2The data has sympathy scores, a 11-point scale, for eight parties. Since the survey asked 
for sympathy scores for both, CDU and CSU, I constructed a CDU/CSU sympathy score 
such that only CSU scores of respondents from Bavaria and CDU scores for everyone else 
have been used.
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a factual knowledge scale taps the effect of voter sophistication much better (Zaller 1992) 
than education. There are only three factual knowledge questions in the survey but they 
do not scale together (highest inter-item correlation is less than .25). Thus I constructed 
a knowledge scale (X i0) counting the times where respondents placed parties correctly on 
the left right dimension (e.g. the Greens to the left of the CDU). After rescaling it ranges 
from 0 to 1 and has an alpha coefficient of .69. As a last voter sophistication measure I use 
single item measure of respondent’s interest in politics (X u ) ranging from 0  ( =  not at all) 
to 3 ( =  very much). Thus I expect the coefficients to be positive since higher sophistication 
facilitates a deeper understanding of the electoral rules.
According to more refined social class conceptualization (Müller 1999) the role and char­
acter of the working relationship for self-employed citizens can be described by the exercise 
of ’specialized knowledge’ and higher levels of autonomy. Presumably, this has an impact on 
political preferences (especially for FDP- partisanship) and on the awareness of the voting 
rules to support these preferences as well. Thus, I include a dummy scoring 1 for respondents 
who are self-employed (X i2) to account for the fact that members of this particular social 
class are more likely to split their tickets as a means to support their preferences. Hence, I 
expect a positive coefficient for the self-employed dummy.
Finally I include three often used control variables in the context of German voting 
behavior studies which underline the existing cleavage of the German society. I include 
an urbanization dummy (X 1 3 ) scoring one if the respondents report living in a big city or 
suburbs of a big city and a trade union dummy (X 1 4 ) scoring 1  if at least one member of 
the respondent’s household is a union member. Finally, I account for frequency of church 
attendance. This measure ranges from 1 ( =  never) to 4 ( =  more than once a week). I have 
no theoretical expectations for them but I do not confound other measures with the impact 
of these cleavages.
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5 Hypotheses Tests and Results
To get on overview about the covariates and their correlations among them I present de­
scriptive statistics and the correlation matrix of the covariates and the depend variable in 
table 1  and 2 .
[Table 1 and 2 about here]
The functional form of the probit model is non-additive and non- linear. Thus, in order 
to gauge the substantive impact of a coefficient one has to compute predicted values or ’first 
differences’ . This is left for the next step on this project. Nevertheless, the significance of 
the coefficients can be assessed, keeping in mind that they depend on the other covariates 
in the models. The model is as follows:
p(r = i) = <t(X>AV)
The underlying assumption for probit is that the error term is distributed standard 
normal. $  is the standard cumulative normal distribution. To facilitate a comparison of 
West and East Germany I present the probit estimates together in table 3.
[Table 3 about here]
The overall performance of the models for East and West Germany can be assessed by 
comparing various goodness-of-fit measures in the first and the third column. Both models 
perform reasonably well predicting more than two out of three cases correct whereby the 
model for the West (69% correctly predicted) has a slide edge over the East Germany model 
(6 8 % correctly predicted).
Generally, the hypotheses I put forward are supported. Interestingly, however, neither 
the factual knowledge nor interest in politics measure seems to perform very well in West
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or East Germany. Also, the standard cleavage measures have no significant influence on 
the probability to split a ticket, although urbanization comes close in East Germany. This 
might be a regional specialty that voters seem to support the PDS, the former communists, 
in urban regions in the East with at least one vote. Note the PDS won four out of five 
district races in East Berlin.
Comparing the estimates of the full models in the first and the third column, respectively, 
we see interesting differences. In the West ticket splitters are clearly younger than straight 
ticket voters are and the relationship is curvilinear as expected. On cannot find the same 
relationship in the East. As I already stated age is an ambiguous concept. It might well 
be that the effect of age on ticket splitting could be attributed to a cohort effect. In East 
Germany they are collectively born into the political system of the West in 1990 after the 
fall of the Berlin Wall. In West Germany, however, older voters had 40 years more to 
get exercised in voting under the existing voting rules and they - as a cohort - cast more 
frequently straight tickets as opposed to people who were politically socialized in the last 1 0  
to 20 years. However, this hypothesis needs clearly closer examination.
The preference dummy and various partisan measures are significant and the coefficients 
are in the expected directions. A partly unexpected result is obtained as far as the coefficients 
of the self- employed dummy are concerned. While in West Germany self employed people 
are, as expected, more likely to split their ticket because their ’specialized knowledge’ which 
characterizes their working environment makes them more likely to make use of the voting 
rules as a means to support their preferences more effective. In the East, though, there is 
no significant effect of this covariate. This might be because self-employed voters have not 
got enough time to make use of their specialized knowledge relative to other voters.
I dropped the cleavage control variable and two of the three sophistication measures 
keeping education because it seems to tap the underlying concept of sophistication best. 
Then, I restimated the models in order to reassure myself that this has no substantive impact.
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The estimates should stay nearly the same. Since I am more interested in disentangling non- 
strategic ticket splitting from strategic voting I use the more parsimonious specification 
later to estimate a three-choice MNP model. Since estimating a MNP is very difficult, this 
is certainly an appropriate research strategy.
As it can be seen in column two and four of table 3 the estimates stay nearly the same. 
Comparing the p —values between the full and the restricted models within West and East 
Germany provide the same story, although education in the restricted East model is only 
significant at the .1 level. The goodness-of-fit provide further evidence that the exclusion of 
these variables has no effect on the overall performance of the restricted models compared 
to the full models.
In order to disentangle non-strategic ticket splitters from strategic voters I use a different 
dependent variable. My new dependent variable has 3 different outcomes. It scores 1 for a 
respondent recalling casting a straight ticket, 2 for strategic ticket splitters and 3 for a non- 
strategic ticket splitter. Particularly, a strategic ticket splitter is defined as above. These 
are respondents who recall voting for either the local CDU candidate with their first vote 
and for the FDP with their second vote or the local SPD candidate and the Greens. The 
observed distribution of the new dependent variable can be identified as the row marginals 
of the contingency tables in table 4.
[Table 4 about here]
At first I estimated a much simpler multinomial logit (MNL) model. Unfortunately, 
employing a Hausman-Test provided by STATA6.0 I was not able to reassure myself that 
the implied assumption of ’independence of irrelevant alternatives’ (IIA) holds with the data 
I got.3 Thus, I choose MNP to model my new dependent variable since this model does not
3 For a detailed discussion of the IIA assumption and a slightly different implementation 
of MNP see Alvarez et al. (2000).
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assume IIA. The implementation is similar to Lacy and Burden (1999). I used a mainframe 
version of LIMDEP to estimate the models for East and West Germany. Thus, the Vs 
respondents utility for either straight ticket, strategic vote or split ticket is a function of X , 
the covariates I used in the restricted models above. Thus, for respondent i e  {1 ,.... N }  and 
choice alternative of the new dependent variable j  e  {1, 2, 3 } one gets:
A voter is predicted to choose one of the three choice alternatives (straight, strategic 
or split) which has the highest utility, i.e. the highest value for i/cotj. By stacking all 
individual’s utilities for the three choices yields the model:
IID is assumed across observations. Correlations across choices can theoretically be
mate one error standard deviation (â straight) f°r the first choice and one error correlation 
(Pstraight,strategic) f°r choice one or two. If the estimates for <r and p are statistically different 
from 1 and 0, respectively, IIA is rejected. Moreover, as in the case for MNL, one choice 
alternative has to be set to zero as a baseline. I use the third category of non-strategic ticket 
splitters as my baseline. Then, I estimate the difference of choices 1 vs. 3 and choices 2 vs. 
1. Identification is by far the major drawback of estimating M NP’s. The model seems very 
flexible at first, but in order to avoid ’fragile identification’ (Keane 1992) some coefficients 
of ¡3 have to be fixed also. It is a crucial decision for every research design what coefficients 
get fixed. Theory should closely guide these decisions.
I specified the same models for West and East Germany. For the age variables I have 
no specific expectations. However, the coefficient should not be significant in the second 
comparison between strategic and non-strategic ticket splitters. Refining my previous ex­
pectations I anticipate additionally that respondents who paid so much attention to the
U%j — j X  -l ( ! j
U i - P X i  +  a ,  6i — ~ i v 3( 0 , £ ) ,
estimated, although most of them have to be fixed in order to identify the model. I esti-
local race that he or she knows at least the name of the local candidate are less likely to 
cast a non-strategic vote than everything else is. Hereby I assume also, that the frequency 
of possible personal votes among the non-strategic voters is not high enough that it mat­
ters systematically. Thus, the coefficient of the personal dummy should positive for both 
comparisons, straight ticket voters vs. ticket splitters and strategic voter vs. ticket split­
ters, in the models for West and East Germany alike. Similarly I also expect that strong 
partisans either cast a straight ticket or vote strategically in order act efficiently given their 
preferences and contextual constraints. Thus, the coefficient for both comparisons should be 
positive. Further, as it can be seen from the probit result in table 3, voters with a clear party 
preferences are more likely to cast a straight ticket than a to split their ticket. However, to 
refine my expectation, strategic voters should also have a clear party preference in order to 
facilitate the strategic decision calculus.
While I have no further refinement concerning my hypothesis for big party identifier I 
assume that there is no influence for small party identifier for straight ticket voters vs. ticket 
splitters but I expect these identifiers to be more likely to vote strategically. It is in the 
core of my theory about strategic voting that these people are typical suspects of strategic 
voters. Another crucial decision was to fix the coefficient of the loyalty dummy for the second 
comparison at 0. I assume that a tendency of voting for the same party should not distinguish 
between strategic splitters and non-strategic splitter but I expect as in the probit case that 
ticket splitters are less loyal, hence the coefficient should be positive for the assessment of 
straight ticket voters versus ticket splitters. Finally, while higher education and being self­
employed have been factors predicting whether a voter split his or her ticket, I refine now 
my previous expectation and argue that these factors should specifically facilitate strategic 
voting. Thus, I expect the coefficients to be positive for comparison of strategic voters to 
the baseline of ticket splitters. The MNP estimates are presented separately for West and 
East Germany in table 5.
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[Table 5 about here]
As it can be seen, the model performs better for West Germany than for East Germany. 
The percentage of correctly classified voters (PCC) is slightly higher for the West German 
model. In general, the estimates provide support for the refined and more specified hypothe­
ses. If we focus for a moment only on the second comparison it gets obvious how much more 
information is extracted from the lump sum of all ticket splitters by refining and including 
more theory to the typical ticket splitting discussion. As a common result for East and West 
Germany, identifier of the FDP or the Greens are more likely strategic voters as opposed 
to non-strategic ticket splitters. Moreover, voters who know at least the name of the local 
candidate they voted for, such that they sufficiently comprehend the election rules and pay 
attention to the local race as well, are either straight ticket voters or strategic voters but are 
less likely to split their ticket in a non-strategic fashion.
It is in the nature of the beast that the extremity of partisan attachments takes on a 
specific role in East Germany. Until the election in 1998 the former citizens of the GDE 
had only twice the possibility to vote in Federal elections and only eight years of political 
live to develop a party identification. Strong partisans in the East more likely to be either a 
straight ticket voter or a strategic voter but less likely to be a non-strategic ticket splitter. 
Strong feelings towards one party facilitates strategic voting in East Germany, not so in West 
Germany, instead of non-strategic ticket splitting. It also favors straight over non-strategic 
ticket splitting.
In West Germany, most people have developed a party identification and some even feel 
very close to the party. But they might have conflicting attitudes or unclear preferences 
towards the political parties. Having a clear first preference is decisive for distinguishing 
between straight ticket or strategic voting on the one hand and non- strategic ticket splitting 
on the other hand. Thus, it takes on for West Germany what is the role of strength of par­
tisanship in East Germany. Furthermore, high education and being self-employed facilitates
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strategic voting as opposed to ticket splitting only in West Germany.
6 Conclusion
The paper is an example of how much more can be learned if we reconsider and refine our 
theories. I included a theory about strategic voting into the typical ticket splitting discussion. 
Prom that I derived more specific hypotheses. By using appropriate methods to test these 
hypotheses I was able to extract more information from the lump sum of all ticket splitters 
as before. The paper makes more transparent the relationship between strategic voting and 
non-strategic voting behavior. It also makes more transparent the process that underlies the 
decision to cast a strategic vote. Strategic voting in Germany comes in two types. Voter do 
employ two different strategies which are observationally equivalent (Gschwend 1999).
A common result for East and West Germany in this paper is that identifier of the FDP 
or the Greens are more likely strategic voters as opposed to non-strategic ticket splitters. 
There are also differences between the two parts of Germany. Non-strategic ticket splitters 
in East Germany do not feel close to any political party. In West Germany non-strategic 
ticket splitters have conflicting party preferences.
Improvements can be made along several directions. First, I could include better measures 
for political awareness or sophistication. Also interesting would be to examine the impact 
of coalition preferences, personal votes and the perceived closeness of the small parties to 
the 5% threshold. This would require searching more for appropriate questions and impute 
them into this data set. Second, it would be useful to combine aggregate data and individual- 
level data in order to account more realistically for social context, the strength of local part 
platforms and the like. Third, using this research design, clearly, predicted values have to be 
computed in order to assess the impact of several covariates or the relevance of the restricted 
coefficients on substantive conclusions. As it can be seen in table 5, the estimates of the 
error covariances do not reject IIA. Thus, from this result it follows that I may use MNL
15
instead, which is easier to estimate and I could easy get simulate predicted probabilities and 
uncertainty measures for them.
16
References
Alvarez, E. Michael, Jonathan Nagler, and Shaun Bowler. 2000. “Issues, Economics, and 
the Dynamics of Multyparty Elections: The British 1987 General Election.” American 
Political Science Review 94(March): 131-149.
Baker, Kendall L., Eussel J. Dalton, and Kai Hildebrandt. 1981. Germany transformed. 
Political Culture and the New Politics. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Beck, Paul Allen, Lawrence Baum, Aage E. Clausen, and Charles E. Smith, Jr. 1992. “Pat­
terns and Sources of Ticket Splitting in Subpresidential Voting.” American Political Sci­
ence Review 86(December):916-928.
Cain, Bruce, John Ferejohn, and Morris Fiorina. 1987. The Personal Vote. Constituency 
Service and Electoral Independence. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Campbell, Angus, and Warren E. Miller. 1957. “A new approach to the Study of Ticket 
Splitting.” American Political Science Review 51(June):293-312.
DeVries, Walter, and V. Lance Tarrance. 1972. The Ticket-Splitter: A New Force in Am er­
ican Politics. Grand Eapids: Eerdsmans.
Duverger, Maurice. 1954. Political Parties. New York: Wiley.
Fiorina, Morris P. 1992. Divided Government. New York: Macmillian.
Gschwend, Thomas. 1999. “Strategic Voting in Germany. Evidence employing King’s Ecolog­
ical Inference.” Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the Southern Political Science 
Association.
Hilmer, Eichard, and Nicolas Schleyer. 1999. “Stimmensplitting bei der Bundestagswahl 
1998. Strukturen, Trends und Motive [Ticket splitting at the Federal election in 1998.
17
Structures, Trends and Motifs].” Paper presented at the annual meeting of the DVPW  
Section: Elections and Public Opinion.
Keane, Michael P. 1992. “A Note on Identification in the Multinomial Probit Model.” Journal 
of Business & Economic Statistics 10(April):193-200.
Lacy, Dean, and Barry C. Burden. 1999. “The Vote-stealing and Turnout Effects of Ross 
Perot in the 1992 US Presidential Election.” American Journal of Political Science 
43( January) :233-255.
Müller, Walter. 1999. “Class Cleavages in Party Preferences in Germany - Old and New.” 
In The End of Class Politics? Class Voting in Comparative Context ( Geoffrey Evans, 
editor), Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 137-180.
Schoen, Harald. 1999a. “Mehr oder weniger als fünf Prozent - Ist das wirklich die Frage? 
[More or less than five percent - Is that really the question?].” Kölner Zeitschrift für 
Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie 51(September):565-581.
Schoen, Harald. 1999b. “Split-ticket voting in German Federal elections, 1953-90: an example 
of sophisticated balloting?” Electoral Studies 18:473-496.
Thurner, Paul W., and Franz Urban Pappi. 1998. “Measuring and Explaining Strategic 
Voting in the German Electoral System.” Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the 
American Political Science Association.
Thurner, Paul W., and Franz Urban Pappi. 1999. “Causes and Effects of Coalition Prefer­
ences in a Mixed-Member Proportional System.” Arbeitspapiere - Mannheimer Zentrum 
für Europäische Sozialforschung, Nr. 1.
Walter R. Mebane, Jr. 2000. “Coordination, Moderation, and Institutional Balancing
18
in American Presidential and House Elections.” American Political Science Review 
94 (March) :37-57.
Zaller, John E. 1992. The Nature and Origins of Mass Opinion. New York: Cambridge 
University Press.
19
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics of the Model Variables
West Germany East Germany
Variables N Mean Std.Dev. Min Max N Mean Std.Dev. Min Max
Ticket Splitting 978 0.36 0.48 0 1 1041 0.43 0.49 0 1
Age 971 44.29 16.08 18 97 1039 44.94 15.84 18 87
Age2 971 2219.88 1588.04 324 9409 1039 2270.20 1524.56 324 7569
Personal 978 0.20 0.40 0 1 1041 0.19 0.39 0 1
Preference 978 0.81 0.39 0 1 1041 0.77 0.42 0 1
Strength of PID 978 1.14 1.00 0 3 1041 0.97 1.01 0 3
PID big parties 978 0.31 0.46 0 1 1041 0.20 0.40 0 1
PID small parties 978 0.29 1.28 0 1 1041 0.14 0.92 0 1
Loyalty 978 0.42 0.49 0 1 1041 0.47 0.50 0 1
Education 966 3.80 2.18 1 9 1027 4.30 2.21 1 9
Knowledge 978 0.67 0.33 0 1 1041 0.73 0.33 0 1
Interest in Politics 976 1.53 0.74 0 3 1041 1.51 0.77 0 3
Self-employed 978 0.06 0.25 0 1 1041 0.07 0.26 0 1
Urbanization 978 0.42 0.49 0 1 1041 0.35 0.48 0 1
Trade Union 978 0.21 0.41 0 1 1041 0.21 0.41 0 1
Church attendance 958 2.44 1.13 1 4 1031 1.67 1.00 1 4
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Table 2 . Correlation Matrix for East and West German Voters
Correlation Matrix Y X 1 X 2 X 3 X 4 X 5 X 6 X j X 8 X 9 X 10 X 1 1 X 12 X 13 X 14
Y Ticket Splitting 1.00
X , Age -0.11 1.00
X 2 Age2 -0.09 0.98 1.00 West Germany
X 3 Personal -0.22 0.03 0.03 1.00
X 4 Preference -0.20 0.02 0.02 0.05 1.00
X 5 Strength of PID -0.31 0.06 0.05 0.21 0.21 1.00
X 6 PID big parties -0.31 0.17 0.15 0.19 0.15 0.59 1.00
X j PID small parties 0.09 -0.08 -0.08 -0.01 0.07 0.19 -0.15 1.00
X 8 Loyalty -0.19 0.02 0.04 0.05 0.04 0.17 0.16 -0.03 1.00
X 9 Education 0.09 -0.20 -0.19 0.06 0.01 0.11 0.07 0.20 -0.16 1.00
X 10 Knowledge -0.05 -0.10 -0.10 0.09 0.01 0.23 0.17 0.15 -0.05 0.38 1.00
X n Interest in Politics -0.09 0.08 0.08 0.16 0.09 0.34 0.33 0.11 -0.04 0.27 0.34 1.00
X 12 Self-employed 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.11 -0.02 0.05 0.04 0.04 -0.01 0.06 0.06 0.09 1.00
X 13 Urbanization -0.04 0.02 0.03 -0.02 -0.02 0.04 0.03 0.06 0.00 0.13 0.09 0.05 -0.05 1.00
X 14 Trade Union -0.10 -0.04 -0.06 0.06 0.08 0.10 0.04 0.06 0.07 -0.08 -0.04 0.04 -0.10 0.04 1.00
X 15 Church attendance -0.06 0.13 0.14 0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.09 -0.10 0.04 -0.06 -0.04 0.03 -0.07 -0.13 -0.04
Correlation Matrix Y X 1 X 2 X 3 X 4 X 5 X 6 X j X 8 X 9 X 10 X 1 1 X 12 X 13 X 14
Y Ticket Splitting 1.00
X 1 Age -0.10 1.00
X 2 Age2 -0.09 0.98 1.00 East Germany
X 3 Personal -0.15 0.00 -0.01 1.00
X 4 Preference -0.20 0.06 0.05 0.04 1.00
X 5 Strength of PID -0.27 0.06 0.05 0.14 0.23 1.00
X 6 PID big parties -0.23 0.18 0.18 0.11 0.15 0.49 1.00
X j PID small parties 0.03 -0.05 -0.05 0.01 0.01 0.16 -0.08 1.00
X 8 Loyalty -0.21 0.02 0.03 0.06 0.09 0.24 0.18 0.04 1.00
X 9 Education 0.01 -0.09 -0.11 0.13 -0.01 0.19 0.02 0.18 0.02 1.00
X 10 Knowledge -0.08 -0.16 -0.17 0.14 0.09 0.23 0.04 0.11 0.04 0.30 1.00
X 1 1 Interest in Politics -0.16 0.15 0.13 0.20 0.07 0.38 0.24 0.08 0.12 0.33 0.32 1.00
X 12 Self-employed -0.03 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.04 0.03 0.02 0.05 0.03 0.06 1.00
X 13 Urbanization 0.04 -0.05 -0.05 0.03 -0.01 0.01 0.02 0.04 0.06 0.07 0.05 0.06 0.07 1.00
X 14 Trade Union -0.08 -0.05 -0.08 0.10 0.01 0.07 0.05 0.00 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.11 -0.08 -0.02 1.00
X 15 Church attendance -0.05 0.10 0.10 0.09 0.10 0.09 0.17 -0.04 0.05 0.02 0.01 0.04 0.05 -0.03 -0.10
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Table 3 . Probit Estimates of Ticket Splitting for East and West German Voters
Dependent Variable: Ticket Splitting
West Germany East Germany
Independent Variable s Coeff. Std.Err. p Coeff. Std.Err. p Coeff. Std.Err. p Coeff. Std.Err. p
Age -0.053 0.016 0.001 -0.059 0.016 0.000 -0.009 0.015 0.540 -0.014 0.015 0.344
Age2 0.001 0.000 0.003 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.798 0.000 0.000 0.532
Personal -0.698 0.136 0.000 -0.710 0.134 0.000 -0.395 0.115 0.001 -0.437 0.113 0.000
Preference -0.514 0.117 0.000 -0.501 0.115 0.000 -0.416 0.100 0.000 -0.418 0.099 0.000
Strength of PID -0.280 0.067 0.000 -0.282 0.065 0.000 -0.197 0.053 0.000 -0.231 0.050 0.000
PID big parties -0.423 0.148 0.004 -0.414 0.143 0.004 -0.332 0.133 0.012 -0.336 0.129 0.009
PID small parties 0.110 0.036 0.002 0.106 0.036 0.003 0.067 0.048 0.163 0.069 0.047 0.143
Loyalty -0.403 0.097 0.000 -0.442 0.096 0.000 -0.408 0.086 0.000 -0.386 0.085 0.000
Education 0.059 0.023 0.012 0.050 0.022 0.020 0.043 0.021 0.039 0.032 0.019 0.098
Knowledge -0.173 0.159 0.278 ---- -0.170 0.142 0.233 ----
Interest in Politics 0.046 0.070 0.513 ---- -0.070 0.066 0.289 ----
Self-employed 0.422 0.183 0.021 0.474 0.180 0.008 -0.151 0.157 0.337 -0.119 0.156 0.444
Urbanization -0.137 0.095 0.149 ---- 0.145 0.088 0.100 ----
Trade Union -0.150 0.118 0.202 ---- -0.170 0.107 0.112 ----
Church attendance -0.045 0.042 0.287 ---- 0.010 0.043 0.819 ----
Constant 1.923 0.435 0.000 1.841 0.398 0.000 0.950 0.356 0.008 0.917 0.342 0.007
N 950 950 1018 1026
PCP 68.902 68.310 67.530 67.706
ePCP 61.857 61.790 59.645 59.623
PMC 62.043 61.419 62.043 61.419
PRE 18.072 17.862 14.458 16.297
Note. p values are for two-tailed tests.
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Table 4 . Cross tabulation of actual vs. predicted choices
1 2 3 Actual
W est Germany straight strategic split Total
1 straight 441 39 131 612
2 strategic 40 15 20 75
3 split 130 21 112 263
Predicted Total 611 75 264 N=950
1 2 3 Actual
East Germany straight strategic split Total
1 straight 373 24 188 585
2 strategic 24 5 13 42
3 split 188 14 189 391
Predicted Total 586 43 390 N=1018
Note. Row indicator is actual, column is predicted. Column totals may be 
subject to rounding error.
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Table 5 . MNP Estimates for Three-Choice Ticket Splitting Model
WEST GERMANY
Straight Ticket/Ticket Splitting Strategic Voting/Ticket Splitting
Independent Variables Coeff. Std.Err. P Coeff. Std.Err. p
Age 0.577 0.326 0.076 -0.370 0.379 0.329
Age2 -0.053 0.031 0.089 0.038 0.038 0.308
Personal 1.037 0.339 0.002 0.698 0.277 0.012
Preference 0.641 0.240 0.007 0.180 0.052 0.001
Strength of PID 0.371 0.117 0.002 0.302 0.258 0.241
PID big parties 0.529 0.267 0.048 0.065 0.283 0.819
PID small parties 0 fixed 1.171 0.406 0.004
Loyalty 0.482 0.212 0.023 0 fixed
Education -0.013 0.038 0.728 0.180 0.052 0.001
Self-employed -0.318 0.330 0.335 0.712 0.341 0.037
Constant -2.037 0.940 0.030 -1.815 0.824 0.028
N 950
PCC 59.789
s  (straight) 0.652 0.679 0.337
p(straight,strategic) -0.370 0.379 0.329
Note. p values are for two-tailed tests.
EAST GERMANY
Straight Ticket/Ticket Splitting Strategic Voting/Ticket Splitting
Independent Variables Coeff. Std.Err. P Coeff. Std.Err. p
Age 0.004 0.016 0.810 -0.049 0.034 0.146
Age2 0.000 0.000 0.944 0.001 0.000 0.130
Personal 0.603 0.199 0.003 0.886 0.262 0.001
Preference 0.447 0.163 0.006 0.396 0.264 0.133
Strength of PID 0.269 0.085 0.002 0.297 0.124 0.016
PID big parties 0.341 0.176 0.053 0.229 0.254 0.367
PID small parties 0 fixed 0.222 0.082 0.007
Loyalty 0.355 0.152 0.020 0 fixed
Education -0.021 0.024 0.373 0.050 0.054 0.348
Self-employed 0.118 0.184 0.523 0.059 0.361 0.870
Constant -0.728 0.446 0.102 -1.489 0.715 0.037
N 1018
PCC 55.697
s  (straight) 0.197 1.457 0.892
p(straight,strategic) -0.049 0.034 0.146
Note. p values are for two-tailed tests.
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